Lucca and Moench (2015) document large average excess returns in the S&P500 index before scheduled Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meetings from September 1994 to March 2011, leading to a puzzle not explained by standard asset pricing theory.
Introduction
In their influential paper, Lucca and Moench (2015) , henceforth LM, document large average excess returns in the S&P500 index before scheduled FOMC meetings. Over the sample period from September 1994 to March 2011, the index on average increases by 49 basis points during the 24 hours before the scheduled 2:15 pm FOMC announcements (2:00 pm to 2:00 pm window). These pre-FOMC returns account for approximately 80% of the annual realized excess stock returns in this period. This finding is deemed a puzzle because standard asset pricing theories cannot explain such asset behavior.
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In this paper, we first replicate the original LM result over their sample period. We then extend the sample from April 2011 to December 2017 and find that the S&P500 index, as well as other major international equity indices, did not experience statistically significant excess returns over this more recent period. The puzzle has, therefore, disappeared in recent times. The Quandt-Andrews test based on Andrews (1993) and the Bai and Perron (2003) test identify April 2010 as the date of the structural break when the S&P500 index stopped experiencing positive pre-FOMC announcement returns.
We discuss four possible explanations for this disappearance of the pre-FOMC drift: economic and market conditions, uncertainty surrounding monetary policy and the zero lower bound, changes in FOMC communication policies, and the fact that the LM finding has been public since 2011. Building on the results in LM, we conclude that the most plausible explanation is also the simplest one: investors have learned about the drift, taken advantage of it, and arbitraged the return away. Using intraday index price data, we denote price at time t by P t , compute the return as R t = (P t − P t−1 )/P t−1 , subtract the risk-free rate, and compute the log excess return er t . Following LM, we focus on the return in the 24 hours ending 15 minutes before the scheduled announcement. For example, for announcements released at 2:15 pm, the return is computed from 2:00 pm on the day preceding the announcement day to 2:00 pm on the announcement day. The S&P500 index returns on non-announcement days are computed in the same 2:00 pm-to-2:00 pm window during the period from September 1994 to March 2011 and in the 1:45 pm-to-1:45 pm window during the period from April 2011 to December 2017. 3 This suggests that the pre-FOMC announcement drift has disappeared in recent times.
Focusing on the announcement days, we compute cumulative excess returns over a threeday window around the FOMC announcements (from one day before the announcement to the day after the announcement). The top panel of Figure We present the time-series of the pre-FOMC announcement drift in Figure 2 . Following LM, we show a one-year moving average, which corresponds to eight FOMC announcements.
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This figure also suggests that the pre-announcement drift has disappeared in the recent period.
In Table 2 , we report the estimation results of the key LM regression:
where the explanatory variable is an indicator variable equal to one during the 24-hour cum-dividend index returns. 4 Unreported figures show no qualitative differences between the three subgroups of announcement times in our sample (12:30, 2:00, and 2:15 pm).
5 Like LM, we omit an outlier return of 9.55% on October 29, 2008 when constructing this figure. (1). The dependent variable in the first column is the log excess return of the S&P500 index computed as explained at the beginning of Section 2. The dependent variable in the last five columns is the daily log close-to-close return on the German DAX, the British FTSE100, the French CAC40, the Spanish IBEX, and the Swiss SMI indices. Sample sizes vary across indices due to data availability. Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The remaining five columns report the results for five European equity indices (German DAX, British FTSE100, French CAC40, Spanish IBEX, and Swiss SMI) as in LM. For these indices, the dependent variable is the daily log close-to-close return and, because of the time zone differences, these close-to-close returns never include the FOMC announcements. The results show that the pre-FOMC returns have disappeared in international indices as well, with the exception of the FTSE100 where the drift remains significant although with a lower magnitude.
Finally, we conduct a structural break analysis to find out when the S&P500 index stopped experiencing positive pre-FOMC returns. Both the Quandt-Andrews test based on Andrews (1993) However, LM find no significant relations between pre-FOMC returns and changes in industrial production, nonfarm payroll, or inflation, concluding that the drift is not countercyclical. Moreover, our updated sample was not as quiet as one may think with notable events such as the European debt crisis peaking in 2012, the worldwide stock market selloff in 2015, and Brexit in 2016. In Table 3 , we replicate and extend the LM test relating pre-FOMC returns to the VIX: the second column shows that the relation has become insignificant in the more recent period. It, therefore, seems unlikely that the state of the economy and market conditions can explain the disappearance of the drift.
The second, although related, difference between the LM sample and our sample is the state of and uncertainty surrounding monetary policy. While the LM sample includes a variety of monetary policy states, our sample covers a period during which the effective The first and second columns show results from estimating equation: er t = β 0 + β 1 V IX t + t where er t is the log excess return on the S&P500 index during the pre-FOMC window (24 hours ending 15 minutes prior to the announcement), and V IX t is the level of the VIX index at the market close two days before the scheduled announcement (standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one) following LM. The third and fourth columns show results from estimating equation: In Table 3 , we test the relation between the 10-year U.S. Treasury Note Volatility Index Table 3 shows that the pre-FOMC drift has disappeared both for regular meetings and for the meetings that are accompanied by a press conference and an SEP release. It is, therefore, unlikely that changes in communication policies can explain the disappearance of the drift.
The fourth possible explanation is that the drift was discovered and made public by Lucca and Moench in 2011 when their working paper became publicly available, and that subsequent action by market participants has led to the disappearance of the drift. LM report that a trading strategy of holding the index only during the 24 hours prior to FOMC meetings would have generated an annualized Sharpe ratio higher than one. Consistent with 9 See Wright (2012) and Lutz (2015) for the timeline of monetary policy events and related FOMC announcements since the 2008 crisis.
10 The TYVIX index is available only as of January 2003. Like the VIX, the overall level of the TYVIX is lower during the more recent sample, but it has remained volatile.
11 During our sample, these "special" meetings took place in April, June and November of 2011, January, April, September and December of 2012, and March, June, September and December of subsequent years. the findings in McLean and Pontiff (2016) , it is plausible that the pre-FOMC announcement drift was arbitraged away following its discovery by academic researchers.
Conclusion
The pre-FOMC announcement drift of Lucca and Moench (2015) has disappeared since its discovery. Building on the findings in LM, it seems unlikely that the state of the business cycle, the state of monetary policy, and changes in the FOMC communication policies can explain this disappearance. The simplest explanation is that investors learned about this mispricing, and it disappeared.
